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Abstract 
We study the effects of anti-competitive service regulation by examining whether 
OECD countries with less anti-competitive regulation see a better economic performance of 
manufacturing industries using less-regulated services more intensively. Our results indicate 
that lower service regulation translates into faster value added, productivity, and export 
growth of downstream service-intensive industries. The negative growth-effect of anti-
competitive regulation is particularly relevant in the case of professional services and energy 
provision. Our estimates prove robust to accounting for alternative forms of regulation (such 
as product and labor market regulation), for the degree of financial development and also to 
a number of other specification checks. 
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1. Introduction
1 
Do countries with less anti-competitive service regulation perform better economically? 
Policy makers appear to think so as regulatory barriers have fallen in many countries. And 
their position is generally supported by a large empirical literature looking at the effects of 
entry barriers, red-tape costs or legal requirements on economic performance. Much of this 
literature examines the effects of service regulation on the performance of the regulated 
service. Less is known about how service deregulation affects the economic performance of 
downstream manufacturing activities, which is surprising as regulation affects many key 
service inputs. 
In this paper we study how regulation in the supply of a variety of services impacts on 
the economic performance of downstream manufacturing industries. We do so by examining 
whether countries with less regulation of a given service see faster value added, productivity, 
and export growth in manufacturing industries using the service more intensively (this 
methodology was pioneered for financial service by Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Our measures 
of service regulation are OECD indicators designed to capture anti-competitive regulatory 
settings for the energy sector, the telecommunication sector, the transportation sector and for 
professional services. These include barriers to entry, the integration between a priori 
competitive activities and natural monopolies  (in the case of energy) or restrictions on prices 
and fees, advertising, form of business etc. among professionals.  
Our empirical findings indicate that lower service regulation have non-negligible 
positive effects on service intensive users in terms of value added, productivity and export 
growth. For example, our estimates imply that the annual value added growth differential 
between an industry at the 75th percentile (Pulp, paper and printing) relative to one at the 25th 
percentile (Fabricated metal products) of dependence on regulated services is approximately 
0.8-1% higher in a country with regulation at the 25th percentile (as Canada) than in a country 
close to the 75th percentile (as France). Our analysis indicates the aggregate effect is mainly 
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Ichino, Giovanni Pica, Fabiano Schivardi and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, University of Bologna, 
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driven by barriers to entry and vertical integration in the provision of energy (electricity and 
gas) and by anti-competitive regulation in professional activities. On the other hand, the level 
of regulation in transportation and telecommunication services does not seem to play a 
significant role for downstream industries. These findings have relevant implications in terms 
of competition policy. For example, our estimates imply that removing the regulation of price 
and tariffs among professions, industries making intense use of their services (as Chemicals 
and Pharmaceuticals) would grow by 0.5 percentage points more relatively to less intensive 
users (as Fabricated Metal Products). Similar results would be obtained from the complete 
separation between energy generation (or import) and other segments of the industry (as 
transmission or final sales). These findings are not affected by accounting for other forms of 
regulation and prove robust to a number of specification checks.  
The nexus between service-efficiency and manufacturing-growth has been mainly 
examined in the case of financial development. In their seminal paper Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) argued that if financial development increases aggregate productivity growth by 
lowering the cost of external funds then growth in intensive external finance industries should 
be faster in financially developed countries. We apply a similar reasoning and examine the 
relative performance of industries relying more intensively on service inputs for technological 
reasons, in countries with different levels of regulation. Our paper differs from Rajan and 
Zingales’ in three main respects, however. First, we extend previous research explicitly 
focusing on a number of key service inputs, including finance. Our results suggest that 
deregulation is not less relevant than financial development for the economic performance of 
downstream industries. Second, we focus on multiple performance indicators, showing that 
service regulation not only determines a reallocation of value added within manufactures but 
also impacts on downstream industries productive efficiency, measured as per worker 
productivity. Finally, our findings indicate service-efficiency matters for growth even in a 
restricted sample of high-income countries, for which the finance-growth nexus has often 
proved not significant in previous studies. Comparing the results obtained using nominal as 
opposed to real value added data we show that this somehow puzzling result can be explained 
with the negative effect output increases have on price dynamics at the country-industry level.  
Two recent papers used the OECD regulation data to look at own-industry 
consequences of restrictions to competition. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) look at regulation   5
and productivity in 17 manufacturing and 6 service sectors in OECD countries, finding strong 
effects on multifactor productivity growth for those countries located further away from the 
technological frontier. Alesina et al. (2005) show that regulatory reforms in sectors which 
were traditionally most heavily sheltered from competition (transport, communication and 
energy) have had a significant positive impact on their pattern of capital accumulation. Our 
evidence complements these findings suggesting that sectoral reforms might or might not 
translate into positive indirect effects on downstream industries. Our work also relates to a 
growing strand of recent research adopting the Rajan and Zingales approach to study the 
effect of overall regulation on manufacturing performance based on a variety of other 
technological characteristics. Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) look at the effects of barriers 
to entry on the industrial structure exploiting technology-determined differences in natural 
barriers to entry (as start-up costs or minimum scale of production). They find that regulation 
favours within-industry concentration of production, but does not affect its reallocation across 
industries within countries. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) show that European countries 
with more costly entry regulations experience slower growth in the number of firms in 
industries with high entry in the US. Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) show that countries 
where it takes less time to register new businesses experienced more entry in industries 
benefiting from expansionary global demand and technology shifts. As we will show, our 
main findings are robust to accounting for these determinants of growth differentials at the 
industry level. The only other paper we are aware of relating service competition to users 
performance is Allegra et al. (2004) who find the average 1995-2002 growth rate of exports 
by Italian manufacturing industries to be lower the stronger their dependence on those 
services the antitrust authorities have been intervening more frequently over the same period. 
2. Background  
Anti-competitive sectoral regulation is associated to allocative and productive inefficiencies 
which eventually affect the level of final prices in the regulated sector.
2 When concerning the 
production of key intermediate inputs, regulatory barriers might therefore have relevant 
indirect effects on the performance of downstream industries. In particular, by influencing the   6
price of inputs that complement physical or organizational capital (as energy or business 
services) service regulation ends up entering users’ costs of capital adjustment. As a 
consequence, service intensive industries in high regulated countries might tend to under-react 
to global investment opportunities relatively to low regulated countries. 
We will check this implication comparing the growth performances of manufacturing 
industries with different degrees of technological dependence on service inputs in high and 
low regulated countries. Following the financial development literature, our cross-country and 
industry regressions would account for time-invariant country and industry differences in 
unobserved determinants of both regulation and economic performance, thus accounting for 
standard concerns with cross-country regressions, like reverse causation, multicollinearity, 
and omitted variable biases. This approach has recently been adopted to examine a variety of 
other technological characteristics that could lead to industries growing faster in some 
countries than others (see Levine 2005 for a survey of the literature).  
We recover two measures of the degree of industry dependence on service inputs (wj,s) 
from Input-Output (I-O) account matrices. We proxy direct dependence of industry j on 
service s with the ratio between the total cost of purchased services and the value of industry 
output (the so-called “technical coefficients”). Our second measure of dependence is 
recovered from the coefficients of the inverse Leontieff matrix and accounts for both direct 
and indirect contributions of service s to the value of production in industry j. These weights 
account for potential effects of anti-competitive service regulation working through industry j 
linkages with other non-regulated industries in the economy.
3  
In our baseline specifications, weights wj,s are computed based on US input-output 
tables, based on the fact that, according to OECD data, the US are the country having had the 
lowest average level of services regulation for the longest time period (see figure 1). As in the 
rest of the literature following Rajan and Zingales, we will therefore assume that US 
industries dependence on services reflects technological differences rather than other country-
specific determinants, as the level of regulation itself. In the robustness section, however, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 For example, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) emphasized how changes in regulation may affect the mark-up of 
prices over marginal costs through their impact on the equilibrium number of firms. Alesina et al. (2005) showed 
how anti-competitive barriers might determine sub-optimal investment decisions by regulated firms. 
3 See Appendix for detailed information on how the direct and indirect weights are obtained from the available 
input-output accounts. Note that in our empirical setting the two measures could yield different results only to 
the extent that they imply relevant changes in service dependence across downstream industries.   7
will exploit an alternative measure of industry-dependence not reflecting input intensities that 
are specific to a country or a level of regulation, to show that while apparently restrictive this 
assumption does not seem to be relevant to our results.  
3. Data  
All the data needed to perform our exercise are available from the OECD.
4 Cross-
country measures of regulation in services are collected from the Product Market Regulation 
(PMR) database assembled coding a large amount of basic information into quantitative 
scores increasing on a common (0 to 6) scale in restrictions to competition. These measures 
quantify the degree to which regulatory settings in a given service are anti-competitive, that is 
“regulations that create barriers to entrepreneurship and restrict competition in domestic 
markets where technology and demand conditions make competition viable” (see Conway 
and Nicoletti, 2006). While PMR measures cover different regulatory areas for each sector, 
we focused on those designed to capture ex-ante anti-competitive measures as barriers to 
entry, vertical integration and market conduct. Entry barriers capture all regulations curbing 
entry and/or distorting market structure relative to a competitive outcome and are available 
for all service sectors.
5 Vertical integration measures whether a priori competitive activities 
(as electricity generation or the final supply of energy) are separated from natural monopolies 
such as the national grid and/or local distribution. Finally, conduct regulation includes 
restrictions on prices and fees, advertising, form of business etc. in professional services. Our 
results prove to be unaffected by extending the analysis to the additional indexes, intended to 
check ex-post enforcement of regulation (as those measuring market structure) or to the 
effects of privatizations. OECD-PMR data cover the main non-manufacturing services in the 
ISIC Rev-3 industry list: energy (electricity and gas), communication (telecommunication and 
postal services), transportation (air, road, rail transportation services) and professional 
services (including accountants, architects, engineers and legal services). While sectoral 
                                                           
4 See the data appendix and Table 1 for detailed variables definition and sources. 
5 For example, in the energy sector they focus on terms and conditions for third party access and the extent of 
choice of supplier for consumers; in the communication sectors they measure legal limitations on the number of 
competitors allowed in each market, ranging from no limitations to limitations in all markets or franchising to a 
single firm; in professional services these are barriers to becoming a member of each of the professions, taking 
the form of licensing and educational requirements, quantitative constraints on the number of suppliers etc.   8
coverage dates back to 1975 for most sectors, only two points in time (1996 and 2003) are 
available for professions.       
We combined PMR information with data on (current and constant price) value added, 
export and employment at the country-industry-year level contained in the OECD Structural 
Analysis (STAN) dataset. These data have been assembled complementing member 
countries’ Annual National Accounts with information from other sources, such as national 
business surveys and censuses, and classified according to the International Standard 
Industrial Classification, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3). 
Finally, inter-industry technological dependences are measured using the OECD 
Input-Output database. This reports matrices of inter-industry transaction-flows of goods and 
services for several OECD countries around the mid-1990s. Consistently with the STAN 
database, the I-O tables are based on ISIC Rev. 3 industry list.  
Assembling the data imposes some constraints on the number of available 
observations: in particular we are forced to restrict our analysis to a relatively limited growth 
period, starting in 1996. This is due to the fact that (a) there are no regulation indicators for 
professions available at earlier dates, and (b) shifting to earlier dates significantly increases 
the number of missing values in industry value added data, due to a reduction in both the 
number of available country data and in the industry breakdown within each country.
6 
Interestingly, however, around the starting year of our growth period the simple correlations 
between OECD regulation indicators and own-sector measures of market outcomes, such as 
final prices to industrial users or indexes of market power at the sector-level, turns to be 
positive (fig. 2).
7 In this paper we are asking whether own-market distortions in services also 
reflect in the pattern of downstream industries economic performance.  
The main variables used in the empirical part are summarized in Table 1 and 
correlations between regulation indicators are showed in Table 3. 
 
                                                           
6 For example, in 1990 the number of observations falls by nearly 25% with respect to 1996.  
7 Specifically, the above mentioned evidence is obtained combining PMR indexes with Eurostat data on energy 
and telecommunication prices on one hand and with profitability-based variables (measuring the degree of 
market competition) in transportation and professional services. Details are available upon request.   9
4. Results 
Regulation and growth: Table 4 reports the results obtained from our baseline value added 
growth regression  
( ) c j j c c j
s
s c s j c j SHARE X w A V , , , , , * * ˆ ε µ µ φ β α + + + + + = ∑  
where  c j A V , ˆ  is the country-industry average compounded rate of real value added 
growth for the period 1996-2002, Xc,s are the beginning-of-period regulation indicators in the 
four services (energy, communication, transportation and professional activities), the weights 
wj,s are the technical coefficients obtained from the 1997 US Input-Output matrix, measuring 
direct industry j dependence on service s inputs, and SHAREj,c is the beginning-of-period 
value-added share of industry j in country c. The weighted average SERVREG= ( ) ∑
s
s c s j X w , , *  
captures within-country differences in the relevance of service sectors regulation for each 
manufacturing industry j.  
The coefficient reported in column 1 of Table 4 indicates that lowering beginning of 
period anti-competitive regulation in the provision of services has a significant and positive 
effect on industry growth. One way to interpret this effect is thinking of the annual value 
added growth differential between an industry with overall service-dependence 
( ( ) ∑ =
s
s j j w D , ) at the 75th percentile (Pulp, paper and printing) and an industry at the 25th 
percentile (Fabricated metal products). The coefficient estimated in column 1 implies this 
differential would raise by approximately 0.75% if regulation were to be uniformly lowered in 
the four services by an amount corresponding to the difference in average regulation between 
the 75
th (France) to the 25
th (Canada) most regulated countries. For comparison, the median 
value added growth rate in our sample is 1.8%. Hence, our findings suggest that in heavily 
service regulated countries resources tend to be reallocated away from service intensive 
industries. This finding is confirmed irrespective of the weighting scheme adopted in the 
regression. This can be seen in column 2 where we replicate the baseline regression using the 
so-called Leontieff transformation of the technical coefficients, accounting for both direct and 
indirect inter-sectoral relationships. While the point estimate is unchanged, the implied effect 
of service deregulation would be slightly larger (about 1%) in this case.    10
Since a large body of work has analyzed the role of financial development for growth 
in a very similar empirical framework, it is important to check the robustness of our findings 
to accounting for the finance-growth nexus. This is obtained in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 
where the original specification is augmented with the interaction between US industry 
external finance dependence and two of the country-specific indicators of financial 
development used by Rajan and Zingales (1998): column 3 considers the ratio of total credit 
provided by the banking sector to GDP, while column 4 focuses on accounting standards. In 
both cases we still estimate significant negative effects of anti-competitive service regulation. 
On the other hand, financial development proves positively and significantly related to 
growth: for example the coefficient estimated in column 3 implies the growth differential 
between the industry at the 75th percentile and the industry the 25th percentile of external 
finance dependence (respectively Plastic products and Pulp and paper) would increase of 
approximately 0.2 percent moving from a country with private credit at the 25th  percentile to 
a country close to the 75th percentile of financial development (Norway and the Netherlands, 
respectively).  
Finally, the last two columns check the robustness of our estimate to changes in the 
regression specification. In column 5 we focused on the relationship between industry growth 
and average (as opposed to initial) service regulation in 1996-2002 using initial regulation as 
instrument, an approach recently followed in the financial development literature, obtaining 
even stronger estimates for the negative role of service regulation. Column 6 further account 
for the 1996-2002 change in regulation (DSERVREG) to show the estimated coefficient is not 
capturing the extent of subsequent deregulation, which might have contemporaneous effects 
on industry value added.  
Our results so far suggest there is a relevant nexus between service-efficiency and 
manufacturing-growth in OECD countries. These are relevant findings in that the estimated 
finance-growth relationship has so far proven not significant when the analysis was restricted 
to sub-samples of high-income countries. For example, the estimated coefficient reported by 
Rajan and Zingales in tab. 4, column 2 (0.118, with a standard deviation of 0.037) falls to -
0.004 (0.019) when the analysis is restricted to OECD countries, and to -0.021 (0.017) when 
further restricting to the same subset of developed countries used here. One possible 
interpretation of this result is the existence of significant heterogeneity in the effects of   11
financial development on growth between rich and poor countries (see Favara, 2003). An 
alternative explanation in a world where high income countries tend to produce differentiated 
goods relatively to poor countries might be the counteracting role of price dynamics following 
the increase in industry output. While we look at output growth, as measured by constant 
price value added, most of the existing cross-country cross-industry papers work with 
nominal value added data. Hence, if lower regulation of services raises output in service-
intensive manufacturing industries by lowering service-input prices, then there are two 
countervailing effects on nominal manufacturing output. A positive effect due to higher 
output and a negative effect due to lower prices. We do in fact find that lower regulation and 
higher financial development translates into lower prices in service-intensive manufacturing 
industries in Table 5 (columns 1 to 3). As a result, when we replicate the real value added 
analysis in Table 4 using nominal value added as in most of the existing literature, the effect 
is largely insignificant (Table 5, columns 4 to 6). 
Regulation, productivity and exports: Does regulation improve downstream 
industries productive efficiency or are the estimated value added growth differentials 
absorbed by offsetting shifts in sectoral employment? Despite its relevance we are not aware 
of any cross-country and cross-industry analyses specifically addressing the interaction 
between efficiency in service provision and average labour productivity in downstream 
industries. Estimates reported in the top panel of Table 6, obtained replicating the previous 
analysis, indicate that anti-competitive service regulation has a significant impact on growth 
of value added per worker, a result that is not affected by accounting for financial 
development or changing the regression specification as in the previous table. On the other 
hand, financial development does not prove a relevant determinant of productivity. To get a 
sense for the economic relevance of the coefficients reported in the first column of in Table 6, 
consider as before the annual value added growth differential between Pulp and paper and 
Fabricated metal products (respectively high and low service users): the coefficient estimated 
in column 6 implies this growth differential is approximately 0.9% higher in a low- than in a 
high-regulation country (respectively Canada and France). For comparison, the median 
productivity growth rate in our sample is 2.2%.  
Finally, we exploited the availability of data on exports to explore whether the sectoral 
reallocation patterns implied by our value added results correspond to changes in international   12
specialization. Results reported in Panel B of Table 6 indicate that this is the case: throughout 
all the usual empirical specifications we find that exports by service intensive industries tend 
to grow disproportionately more in countries with low levels of anti-competitive regulation. 
Hence regulation of inputs causes users to lose competitiveness on the international markets 
compared to similar firms in less regulated countries. 
All in all, our empirical findings point to the existence of non-negligible indirect 
effects of lack of competition in upstream markets for the economic performance of 
downstream manufacturing activities. 
5. Robustness 
Having established our baseline findings, we proceeded to a number of robustness checks 
considering the potential confounding role of country-wide regulation in other markets, the 
appropriateness of US weights in capturing technological dependence on services and the role 
of influential observations.  
The role of product and labor market regulations: First we considered the 
possibility that our estimates are driven by omitted country-industry shocks not captured by 
either country- or industry-fixed effects and correlated with service regulation. If regulation is 
a country-wide phenomenon, our findings might in particular be capturing anti-competitive 
measures targeting other markets, as the labour or the product market. We checked for this 
possibility augmenting the baseline specification with regulation-related variables which have 
been shown to be significant determinants of cross country-industry growth. In columns 1 
and 2 of Table 7 we accounted for country-level measures of employment protection and 
administrative (red-tape) barriers to entrepreneurships (Djankov et al., 2002; Nickell, 2005; 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) interacted with the appropriate industry-level indicator (see 
table note for a detailed description). Both indicators are negatively related to industry 
growth, although the relationship is statistically significant only in the case of red-tape costs. 
On the other hand, the estimated impact of anti-competitive services regulation is unaffected. 
Similarly, our findings prove robust conditioning the estimated effects of regulation on the 
role of central or municipal governments, as captured  by the OECD measures of the extent of   13
public ownerships in energy, transportation and communication services (column 3). Finally, 
column 4 shows robustness to accounting for all regulation variables simultaneously.
8  
The appropriateness of US weights: Second, we dealt with the possibility that using 
I-O weights from a benchmark country does not allow to correctly measure technological 
dependence on service inputs because country-specific weights differ from “true” weights by 
a idiosyncratic component. Such component could be unrelated to other determinants of 
industry growth, a case in which our estimates would be subject to standard attenuation bias, 
or depend on the level of regulation itself, so that using a benchmark country would induce a 
priori ambiguous biases in the estimated coefficients (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006). These 
considerations suggest that neither choosing a different benchmark country nor using cross-
country averages of I-O weights would appropriately tackle the measurement issue. An 
alternative procedure consists in exploiting cross country I-O weights to recover a measure of 
average service-dependence not reflecting input intensities specific to a country or to a level 
of regulation and use it as instrument of US-based service-dependence. Following Ciccone 
and Papaioannou (2006), one such measure could be estimated for each service sector s 
proceeding in two steps. First we regressed country-industry weights wj,c on country 
dummies, industry dummies and industry dummies interacted with country-level regulation in 
sector  s, to estimate the marginal effect of regulation on intensity in each industry j: 
c j c j c j c j X w , , ε δ µ µ + + + = .
9 In this regression, the most deregulated country c  is excluded 
from the sample. Second, we estimated  c j w , ˆ  as the fitted values of wj,c when regulation is set 
at the minimum observed value ( c X ) and country-specific averages are set to zero: 
c j j j X w δ µ ˆ ˆ ˆ + = . The fitted weights  j w ˆ  will thus not reflect input intensities that are 
regulation or country-specific, and can be used as instruments for US weights in the empirical 
specification.  
                                                           
8 Not reported results proved the robustness of the estimated coefficient to other commonly used country-level 
controls as GDP per capita and legal inefficiency (Djankov et al. 2007). Finally, we also accounted for the fact 
that service intensive industries might benefit from high direct protection from competition (for example through 
barriers to trade) in countries with high services regulation. Augmenting the basic specification with country-
industry specific variables accounting for the effects of protection on industry margins (the ratio between current 
prices value added net of labor costs and the value of production), or their exposure to foreign competition 
(import penetration) did not affect our findings, however.  
9 Following Papke and Wooldridge (1996) the estimated regressions account for the fact that the dependent 
variable is fractional.   14
The results obtained following this procedure are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
6 and confirm the negative role of anti-competitive service regulation for growth. The only 
difference between the two columns consists in the choice of the country excluded from the 
service-specific first stage regressions. In column 5 we excluded the US, according to the 
OECD measures the country experiencing the lowest regulation from an historical 
perspective. In column 6, we excluded the least regulated country in each service sector in 
1996 (the US for communications, the UK for energy and transportation, Finland for 
professional services).  
The role of influential observations: Our last robustness check consists in 
accounting for the role of influential observations. To this purpose we checked our results 
when (a) the most and least service intensive industries (respectively, Other non metallic 
mineral products and Machinery and equipment) are removed from the sample (column 7), 
and (b) the most and least service regulated countries (Greece and Sweden, respectively) are 
removed from the sample (column 8). The estimated coefficient on the growth effect of anti-
competitive service regulation is robust to both exercises.  
6. Sector-specific effects  
Having assessed the relevance of service regulation and compared it to the financial 
development literature, we now allow for sector-specific impacts focusing on the unrestricted 
specification  
( ) c j j c c j
s
s c s j s c j SHARE X w A V , , , , , * ˆ ε µ µ φ β α + + + + + = ∑ . 
The estimated βs are easier interpreted recalling they represent a second derivative 
X w A V ∂ ∂ ∂ = ˆ β . Hence, evidence that, say, βs<0 would indicate that, other things equal, 
manufacturing industries that are relatively more intensive users of service s fare better in 
those countries where the provision of such service is relatively less regulated. 
Our results, reported in Table 8, point to the existence of significant sectoral 
heterogeneity underlying the aggregate estimate. This can be seen in columns 1 to 4 where we 
separately considered regulation in energy, professional services, communications and 
transportation, the four services covered by the OECD regulation database. All estimated 
coefficients are negative, but only the first two are statistically significant, a result confirmed   15
when all regressors are jointly considered (column 5). To get a sense for their economic 
relevance, consider the annual value added growth differential between an industry with an 
intensity in professional services at the 75th percentile (Textile and textile products) and an 
industry at the 25th percentile (Fabricated Metal Products). The estimated coefficient in 
column 5 implies this growth differential is approximately 0.8% higher in a country with 
regulation of professions at the 25th percentile (as the UK) than in a country close to the 75th 
percentile (as Spain). This effect is large relative to the median industry value-added growth 
rates in our sample (1.8%) and represents more than one-third of the observed 25
th-75
th 
difference in industry growth rates. A similar exercise performed with high/low energy 
intensive industries would imply a slightly larger growth-effect (1.1%) when moving from a 
heavily regulated energy market (e.g. Italy) to a deregulated country (e.g. Finland).  
All specifications already account for the possibility of contemporaneous effects from 
labor and product market regulation. In column 6 we further checked for the potential 
confounding role of short-run shocks. This amounts to distinguishing whether low regulation 
induces faster growth by service intensive industries or rather facilitates downstream firms 
exploiting industry-level worldwide short-run shocks. While still of interest, evidence in favor 
of the second mechanism would imply that absent these shocks, deregulation would have no 
effects on growth. Fisman and Sarria-Allende, (2004) raised this point in the case of finance, 
suggesting a test for robustness to short run shocks obtained interacting the country-level 
variable of interest with a direct measure of worldwide shocks to industries, measured by US 
industries growth. The underlying idea is simple: if estimates in column 5 were to reflect short 
run shocks, they should be dominated by direct measures of industry-differences in the 
opportunities of expansion. Interestingly, our results indicate that lower regulation of 
professional services (but not energy) does help manufacturing industries accommodating 
short run shocks. On the other hand, however, our previous findings are unaffected and still 
statistically significant.
10 
Exact knowledge of how the OECD evaluates each component of its regulation 
measures allows us use these results to infer the potential effects of competition policies that 
                                                           
10 Estimates in Table 8 proved also robust to removing, as in table 7, sector-specific influential observations at 
the country and industry level.    16
have been high in the recent policy agendas.
11 For example, we calculated that complete 
removal of the two main determinants of conduct regulation in professions, that is (a) bans to 
comparative or price advertising and (b) the regulation of price and tariffs, would imply the 
Textiles-Metal Products growth differential to raise by 0.3 and 0.5 percentage points, 
respectively. As to the energy market, our findings imply the industry growth differential 
associated to (a) creating a liberalized wholesale market for electricity, (b) allowing third 
party access to the electricity and gas transmission grid, or (c) imposing the separation of 
ownership between energy production and its distribution would amount to 0.4, 0.7 and 1.1 
percentage points per year, respectively.
12 
7. Conclusions 
Growing concerns that the existing levels of regulation might reflect “private” rather 
than “public” interests have recently motivated a number of academic and policy-oriented 
researches aimed at evaluating the impact of regulatory barriers on the performance of 
regulated firms.
13 We contribute to this debate highlighting the non-negligible indirect effects 
anti-competitive regulation of key service inputs has on the economic performance of 
downstream manufacturing industries in terms of value added, productivity and export 
growth. Unlike previous studies, our results indicate the nexus between service-efficiency and 
manufacturing-growth is strong even among high-income countries. Interestingly, the 
negative impact of service regulation appears to be particularly relevant for those activities 
(professional services and energy supply) the recent competition policy debate has been 
focusing on most intensively, both in Europe and in other developed countries. 
Our results leave several interesting questions open to future research. On one hand 
the increased availability of detailed firm-level data should allow disentangling whether the 
aggregate growth effects we estimated here are mainly due to entry and exit flows of firms 
with different productivity, to the performance of existing firms or both. On the other, it 
                                                           
11 See for example Paterson et al. (2003) research report on professional services or London Economics (2007) 
final report on energy sector competition inquiry, both prepared for the European Commission, DG Competition. 
See also the Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Hague (2004).  
12 For a detailed description of how different determinants of anti-competitive regulation are defined and enter 
the OECD-PMR indicators, see Conway and Nicoletti (2006).    17
would be important to look deeper into the mechanisms underlying our findings, focusing on 
how regulation affects the industrial organization of services (for example, in terms of number 
and size of firms, of turnover rates etc), on how this shapes service market outcomes and, 
eventually, the pattern of capital accumulation in downstream industries.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13 This literature started with the work by Djankov et al. (2002) showing that the regulation of entry is on 
average associated with higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not higher quality of public or 
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Data appendix 
 
Country sample:  
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. 
 
Industry sample:  
  “Food products, beverages and tobacco” (Isic Rev. 3 = “15-16”), “Textiles and textile 
products” (Isic Rev. 3 = “17-18”), “Leather, leather products and footwear” (Isic Rev. 3 = 
“19”) , “Wood and products of wood and cork” (Isic Rev. 3 = “20”) , “Pulp, paper, paper 
products, printing and publishing” (Isic Rev. 3 = “21-22”), “Coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel” (Isic Rev. 3 = “23”), “Chemicals and chemical products” (Isic Rev. 3 = 
“24”), “Rubber and plastics products” (Isic Rev. 3 = “25”), “Other non-metallic mineral 
products” (Isic Rev. 3 = “26”), “Basic metals” (Isic Rev. 3 = “27”), “Fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipment” (Isic Rev. 3 = “28”), “Machinery and eqipment, 
N.E.C.” (Isic Rev. 3 = “29”), “Electrical and optical equipment” (Isic Rev. 3 = “30-33”), 
“Transport equipment” (Isic Rev. 3 = “34-35”), “Manufacturing N.E.C., recycling” (Isic Rev. 
3 = “36-37”).  
 
Dependence of manufacturing industries on service inputs 
Throughout the paper our weights wj,s are mainly computed as the technical coefficients (see 
below) derived from the US Input-Output accounts in 1997. They are given by the elements 
of the matrix T = M diag (y)
-1 where M is the Industry by Industry (44 × 44) input-output 
matrix, y is the (44 × 1) vector of sectoral total output. In col. 2 of Tables 4 to 6, weights are 
computed as the product of the elements of the Leontieff inverse matrix and the share of value 
added on the output. In formulas, let  v the (44 × 1) vector of sectoral added value. The 
Leontieff inverse matrix is given by F = (I – T)
-1 and satisfies ι’ = q’F where q = diag (y)
-1v is 
the vector collecting the sectoral shares of value added on the output. . According to the last 
relation the value of production in each sector (set equal to one) is decomposed in the 
contribution of value added produced in all the sectors (q) weighted with the (direct and 
indirect) measure of intersectoral dependence (F). Without matrix notation the relation can be 







j k k j f q 1 for k = 1, ..., 44. Weights are then given by the elements qkfk,j.  
 
Data on regulation in selected non-manufacturing sectors 
All the regulatory indicators range on a common (0-6) scale from least to most restrictive 
conditions for competition. Data are available for seven non-manufacturing industries: 
electricity and gas supply, road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport, post and 
telecommunications and professional services (accounting, architects, engineers and legal 
services) and consist of a set of indicators of barriers to entry, vertical integration, market 
structure, price regulation, conduct regulation and public ownership. The following table 
summarizes all the available elementary data and the derived indicators we use in the paper 
















           
Energy  Xc,ENERGY          
Electricity    X X        X 
Gas   X  X  X      X 
          
Communications  Xc,TLCPOST          
Telecom    X  X      X 
Post   X          X 
          
Transport  Xc,TRANSP          
Airlines    X           X 
Rail   X  X  X      X 
Road   X        X     
          
Profes. services  Xc,PROSERV            
Accounting    X           X   
Legal services    X        X   
Architects & 
Engineers   X           X   
 
Barriers to entry take into account legal limitations on the number of companies in 
potentially-competitive markets (for example, conditions for the determination of third party 
access in energy markets or the licensing rules in professional services). Vertical integration 
measures the degree of separation between production/import and other segments of the 
industry (in the energy sectors) or between the operation of infrastructure and the provision of 
railway services (in the rail industry). Market structure reflects the degree of concentration. 
Conduct regulation in professional services is referred to the existence of bans to advertising 
or minimum prices. Public ownership depends on the share of equity owned by central or 
municipal governments in firms of a given sector. See Nicoletti et al. (1999) and Conway and 
Nicoletti (2006) for a complete description of the regulatory indicators of the OECD PMR 
database.    22
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Variables definition and sources 
Variable  Definitions and sources 
Industry level 
wj,s  Industry  j’s dependence on service s.  wj,s includes wj,ENERGY,  wj,TLCPOST,  wj,TRANSP and 
wj,PROSERV that are referred to Energy, Telecommunications and Post, Transports and 
Professional services, respectively. Source: our calculations on 1997 USA Input-Output 
accounts. See also data appendix. 
EDj  Industry j’s dependence on external finance defined as capital expenditure minus internal 
funds. Source: de Serres et al. (2006) on Thomson Financial Worldscope database. 
LABINTj  Industry j’s labor intensity measured as the ratio between employees and total assets in the 
US in 1996. Source: OECD STAN database (total assets are computed from investments 
data using the perpetual inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate).  
GROPj  Annual compounded growth rate of production in real terms in industry j in USA over the 
1996-2002 period. Source: OECD STAN database. 
s j w , ˆ   Estimated industry j’s dependence on service s net of regulation- and country-specific 
determinants of factor demand. For each of the four service sectors 
s j w , ˆ  have been 
estimated according to the following two-steps procedure (see also Ciccone and 
Papaioannou, 2006):  
(a) Regress wj,s,c on country dummies, industry dummies and industry dummies interacted 
with country-level regulation in sector s; the most deregulated country c  is excluded from 
the regression and the estimation follows Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to account for the 
fact that the dependent variable is fractional. (b) Obtain 
s j w , ˆ  as the fitted values of wj,s,c 
when regulation is set at country c  levels and country fixed effects are set to zero. Country 
c  is set to either the USA in all four service sectors (tab. 7, col. 5) or Great Britain, USA 
and Finland for ENERGY and TRANSP, TLCPOST and PROSERV, respectively (Table 7, 
column 6).  
GLOPPj,s  Estimated world-average industry j’s growth opportunities. For each of the four service 
sectors global opportunities (GLOPPj) are the estimated industry value added growth over 
the period 1996-2002 obtained according to the following two-steps procedure (see also 
Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006):  
(a) Regress GROWTHj,c on country dummies, industry dummies and industry dummies 
interacted with country-level regulation in sector s; the USA are excluded from the 
regression. (b) Obtain GLOPPj as the predicted values of GROWTHj,c for the USA.  
Country level 
Xc,s  Regulation indexes on a 0-6 scale (from least to most restrictive conditions) in 1996 in four 
non-manufacturing industries. Xc,s includes Xc, ENERGY,  Xc, TLCPOST,  Xc,TRANSP,  Xc,PROSERV 
referring to energy (electricity and gas), communications (posts and telecommunications), 
transports (air, rail and road), professional services (legal, accounting, engineering and 
architects). Source: OECD Product market Regulation database. Xc, ENERGY takes into 
account the height of entry barriers and the degree of vertical integration in electricity and 
gas supply; Xc, TLCPOST depends only on the height of entry barriers in postal and 
telecommunications services; Xc,TRANSP depends on entry barriers in air, rail and road 
services and on vertical integration in rails; Xc,PROSERV averages regulation creating entry 
barriers and regulation on market conduct in legal services, accounting services, engineers 
and architects. See also data appendix. 
FDc   Financial development in country c measured as Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks 
over GDP in 1996. Source: World Bank’s financial development and structure database 
(based on IMF’s Financial Statistics).  
ACCSTANc  Indicator of financial disclosure in 1983. Source: Rajan, Zingales (1998). 
LMRc  Indicator of employment protection in 1988-1995. Source: Fonseca, Utrero (2005).  
COSTc  Direct start-up costs of obtaining legal status to operate a firm as a share of per capita GDP 
in 1999. Source: Djankov et al. (2002). 
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Table 1: Variables definition and sources (continued) 
Variable Definition  and  source 
Industry - Country level 
GROWTHj,c  Annual compounded growth rate of real value added in industry j in country c over the 
1996-2002 period. Source: OECD STAN database. 
NGROWTHj,c  Annual compounded growth rate of nominal value added in industry j in country c over the 
1996-2002 period. Source: OECD STAN database. 
DEFGROWTHj,c  Annual compounded growth rate of the value added implicit deflator in industry j in 
country c over the 1996-2002 period. Source: OECD STAN database. 
LPGROWTHj,c  Annual compounded growth rate of labor productivity (value added at constant prices per 
employee) in industry j in country c over the 1996-2002 period. Source: OECD STAN 
database. 
EXGROWTHj,c  Annual compounded growth rate of exports at constant prices (current exports are deflated 
with the value added deflator) in industry j in country c over the 1996-2002 period. Source: 
OECD STAN database. 
SHAREj,c  Share of industry j in total value added in manufacturing in country c in 1996. Source: 
OECD STAN database. 
EXSHAREj,c  Share of industry j in exports in manufacturing in country c in 1996. Source: OECD STAN 
database. 
LLPj,c  Natural logarithm of labor productivity (value added at constant prices per employee) in 
industry j in country c in 1996. Source: OECD STAN database. 
SERVREGj,c  Index of exposure of manufacturing industry j to regulation in four selected service sectors 
(energy, communications, transport and professional services). It is computed as 
∑
s
s c s j X w , ,  where s = ENERGY, TLCPOST, TRASP, PROSERV. Source: OECD Product 
market Regulation database and USA 1997 Input-Output accounts.  
DSERVREGj,c  Difference between SERVREGj,c in 1996 and in 2002. Source: OECD Product market 
Regulation database and USA 1997 Input-Output accounts.  
POWNj,c  Index of exposure of manufacturing industry j to the degree of public ownership in three 
selected service sectors (energy, communications, transport). It is computed as 
∑
s
s c s j POWN w , ,  where POWNc,s is an index measuring on a 0-6 scale (increasing with 
the role of public sector) the degree of public ownership in 1996 and s = ENERGY, 
TLCPOST and TRASP. Source: OECD Product market Regulation database and USA 1997 
Input-Output accounts.   24
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  St.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Industry level 
Dependence on energy [wj,ENERGY]  15  0.018 0.010 0.007 0.039 
Dependence on communications [wj,TLCPOST]  15  0.004 0.001 0.002 0.007 
Dependence on transports [wj,TRANSP]  15  0.030 0.014 0.011 0.063 
Dependence on professional services [wj,PROSERV]  15  0.027 0.011 0.013 0.055 
External dependence [EDj]  15  0.697 1.595 -0.450 6.200 
Labor intensity [LABINTj]  15  0.028 0.013 0.004 0.052 
Growth opportunities [GROPj]  15  0.010 0.029 -0.028 0.093 
Country level 
Regulation in energy in 1996 [Xc,ENERGY]  16  4.475 1.338 1.808 6.000 
Regulation in communications in 1996 [Xc,TLCPOST]  16  2.868 1.614 0.000 5.680 
Regulation in transports in 1996 [Xc,TRASP]  16  2.949 1.062 1.530 5.133 
Reg. in professional services in 1996 [Xc,PROSERV]  16  2.464 1.160 0.830 4.178 
Financial development [FDc]  16  0.718 0.272 0.304 1.141 
Labor market regulation [LMRc]  16  1.359 0.491 0.300 1.933 
Red tape costs [COSTc]  16  0.146 0.141 0.012 0.586 
Industry - Country level 
Value added growth 1996-2002 (real terms) [GROWTHj,c]  220  0.018 0.034 -0.081 0.204 
Val. added gr. 1996-2002 (nominal terms) [NGROWTHj,c]  220  0.032 0.038 -0.123 0.221 
Implicit deflator growth 1996-2002 [DEFGROWTHj,c]  220  0.014 0.030 -0.095 0.189 
Labor productivity growth 1996-2002 [LPGROWTHj,c]  220  0.025 0.026 -0.051 0.162 
Export growth 1996-2002 [EXGROWTHj,c]  205  0.050 0.050 -0.094 0.194 
Value added share in 1996 [SHAREj,c]  220  0.069 0.047 0.001 0.234 
Log labor productivity in 1996 [LLPj,c]  220  3.864 0.481 2.821 6.932 
Export share in 1996 [EXSHAREj,c]  220  0.068 0.068 0.000 0.364 













      
Energy [Xc,ENERGY] 1.000       
Communications [Xc,TLCPOST] 0.549 1.000     
Transports [Xc,TRASP]  0.801 0.541 1.000   
Professional services [Xc,PROSERV]  0.497 0.519 0.645 1.000 
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Table 4: Service regulation and growth 


















Service regulation  -0.172*  -0.170* -0.176**  -0.158* -0.198**  -0.287** 
[SERVREGj,c] (0.069)  (0.072)  (0.068)  (0.071) (0.075) (0.080) 
Financial dev. × external dep.     0.010*    0.011*  0.009* 
[FDc × EDj]     (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Accounting stand. × ext. dep.       0.013+    
[ACCSTANc × EDj]       (0.007)    
Change in service regulation            0.320** 
[DSERVREGj,c]           (0.116) 
Initial industry share  0.189**  0.198** 0.169*  0.187**  0.174**  0.163** 
[SHAREj,c] (0.071)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.072) (0.066) (0.062) 
Constant 0.037  0.048+  0.006 -0.001  0.005 0.014 
 (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 220  220  220  220  220  220 
R-squared 0.66  0.66  0.67 0.67  0.68  0.69 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%            
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at the country-industry level for the period 
1996-2002 (GROWTHj,c). SERVREGj,c measures exposure to service regulation at the country-industry level as a weighted 
average (Σs wj,s*Xc,s) of country-level anti-competitive regulation indexes from the OECD-PMR databases. Service regulation 
(Xc,s) is measured in 1996 except in col. (5) where it is the 1996-2002 average value. Interaction weights wj,s are (“direct”) 
technical coefficients of dependence between service sector s and manufacturing industry j computed on the 1997 USA Input-
Output matrix, except for col. (2) where they are measured to account for both direct and indirect dependence (see the data 
appendix for computational details). Financial development is measured as Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks over GDP 
in 1996 (FDc, col. 3) and as accounting standards in 1983 (ACCSTANc, col. 4). It is interacted with External dependence (EDj) 
an industry-level measure of reliance on external finance obtained from US firm-level data. Both interactions follow Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). DSERVREGj,c measures exposure to service deregulation as Σs wj,s*∆Xc,s, where ∆Xc,s is the 1996-2002 change 
in service regulation indexes. SHAREj,c indicates the industry share in total value added in manufacturing in 1996. All 
regressions include (unreported) country- and industry-fixed effects and use (employment) weighted least squares as estimation 
method. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 5: Financial development, prices and nominal growth 
 Prices  Nominal  growth 















Service  regulation  0.210**  0.211**  -0.004    -0.006 
[SERVREGj,c]  (0.072)  (0.070)  (0.078)  (0.078) 
Financial dev. × external dep.   -0.009*  -0.009*    0.005  0.005 
[FDc × EDj]   (0.005)  (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.004) 
Initial industry share      0.027  0.017  0.017 
[SHAREj,c]      (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.050) 
Constant 0.015  0.056**  0.019 0.037*  0.036** 0.037* 
  (0.014) (0.006) (0.013)  (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
Observations 220  220  220  220  220  220 
R-squared 0.62  0.60  0.63 0.64  0.64  0.64 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
 
Notes: 
In cols. 1-3 the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of value added implicit deflator at the industry-
country level for the period 1996-2002 (DEFGROWTHj,c); in cols. 4-6 the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth 
rate of nominal value added at the industry-country level for the period 1996-2002 (NGROWTHj,c). SERVREGj,c measures 
exposure to service regulation at the country-industry level as a weighted average (Σs wj,s*Xc,s) of country-level anti-competitive 
regulation indexes from the OECD-PMR databases. Service regulation (Xc,s) is measured in 1996. Interaction weights wj,s are 
(“direct”) technical coefficients of dependence between service sector s and manufacturing industry j computed on the 1997 
USA Input-Output matrix. Financial development is measured as Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks over GDP in 1996 
(FDc) and is interacted with External dependence (EDj) an industry-level measure of reliance on external finance obtained from 
US firm-level data. SHAREj,c indicates the industry share in total value added in manufacturing in 1996. All regressions include 
(unreported) country- and industry-fixed effects and use (employment) weighted least squares as estimation method. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.   27
Table 6: Service regulation, productivity and exports  


















Panel A: Productivity growth 
Service regulation  -0.201*  -0.218* -0.202* -0.194* -0.228*  -0.280** 
[SERVREGj,c] (0.081)  (0.100)  (0.080)  (0.085) (0.090) (0.106) 
Financial dev. × external dep.     0.009    0.010  0.008 
[FDc × EDj]     (0.006)    (0.006)  (0.005) 
Accounting stand. × ext. dep.      0.006    
[ACCSTANc × EDj]      (0.006)    
Change in service regulation            0.228 
[DSERVREGj,c]           (0.158) 
Initial labor productivity  0.031** 0.032*  0.028* 0.031** 0.030**  0.030** 
[LLPj,c] (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant -0.079+  -0.062  -0.069 -0.082+ -0.073 -0.066 
 (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) 
Observations 220  220  220  220  220  220 
R-squared 0.58  0.58  0.59 0.58 0.60 0.60 
Panel B: Export growth 
Service regulation  -0.213+  -0.249* -0.215* -0.202+ -0.242* -0.297* 
[SERVREGj,c] (0.108)  (0.111)  (0.106)  (0.108) (0.119) (0.121) 
Financial dev. × external dep.     0.005    0.006  0.005 
[FDc × EDj]     (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.006) 
Accounting stand. × ext. dep.      0.010    
[ACCSTANc × EDj]      (0.013)    
Change in service regulation            0.229 
[DSERVREGj,c]           (0.179) 
Initial industry export share  -0.013  -0.007 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.024 
[EXSHAREj,c] (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.055) (0.052) (0.050) 
Constant 0.060**  0.081**  0.059** 0.055**  0.007  0.070** 
 (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) 
Observations 205  205  205  205  205  205 
R-squared 0.72  0.72  0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%              
 
Notes: 
In Panel A the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of labor productivity (value added per employed 
worker) at the industry-country level for the period 1996-2002 (LPGROWTHj,c). In Panel B the dependent variable is the annual 
compounded growth rate of exports at the industry-country level for the period 1996-2002 (EXPGROWTHj,c). SERVREGj,c 
measures exposure to service regulation at the country-industry level as a weighted average (Σs wj,s*Xc,s) of country-level anti-
competitive regulation indexes from the OECD-PMR databases. Service regulation (Xc,s) is measured in 1996 except in col. (5) 
where it is the 1996-2002 average value. Interaction weights wj,s are (“direct”) technical coefficients of dependence between 
service sector s and manufacturing industry j computed on the 1997 USA Input-Output matrix, except for col. (2) where they 
are measured to account for both direct and indirect dependence (see the data appendix for computational details). Financial 
development is measured as Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks over GDP in 1996 (FDc, col. 3) and as accounting 
standards in 1983 (ACCSTANc, col. 4). It is interacted with External dependence (EDj) an industry-level measure of reliance on 
external finance obtained from US firm-level data. Both interactions follow Rajan and Zingales (1998). DSERVREGj,c measures 
exposure to service deregulation as Σs wj,s*∆Xc,s, where ∆Xc,s is the 1996-2002 change in service regulation indexes. LLPj,c 
indicates the log of labor productivity in 1996. EXSHAREj,c indicates the industry share in total exports in manufacturing in 
1996. All regressions include (unreported) country- and industry-fixed effects and use (employment) weighted least squares as 
estimation method. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.   28
 
Table 7: Robustness checks 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
  Other regulation measures  Weights  Influential obs. 
 Empl. 
Protect. 
Red tape  Public 
Own. 








Service regulation  -0.191**  -0.203**  -0.232** -0.269**  -0.193* -0.218*  -0.274**  -0.180* 
[SERVREGj,c]  (0.071)  (0.067) (0.074) (0.074)  (0.087)  (0.105) (0.088) (0.072) 
Fin. dev. × external dep.  0.011** 0.010*  0.010** 0.011** 0.010*  0.010*  0.008*  0.013** 
[FDc × EDj]  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Lab. market reg. × lab. int.  -0.400     -0.547+       
[LMRc × LABINTj]  (0.323)     (0.297)       
Red tape costs × gr. opp.    -1.449+  -1.639+         
[COSTc × GROPj]    (0.871)  (0.862)         
Public  ownership      0.084+  0.061       
[POWNj,c]      (0.047)  (0.046)       
Initial industry share  0.182**  0.135+ 0.152* 0.135*  0.167*  0.165* 0.155* 0.184* 
[SHAREj,c]  (0.067)  (0.069) (0.063) (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.068) (0.071) (0.073) 
Constant 0.019  0.015  0.003  0.033 0.039 0.014 0.055*  0.035 
  (0.024)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) 
Observations  220  220 220 220  220  220 188 193 
R-squared 0.68  0.68  0.68  0.69 0.67 0.67  0.67  0.69 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%            
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at the industry-country level for the period 
1996-2002 (GROWTHj,c). SERVREGj,c measures exposure to service regulation at the country-industry level as a weighted 
average (Σs wj,s*Xc,s) of country-level anti-competitive regulation indexes from the OECD-PMR databases. Service regulation 
(Xc,s) is measured in 1996. Interaction weights wj,s are (“direct”) technical coefficients of dependence between service sector s 
and manufacturing industry j computed on the 1997 USA Input-Output matrix. Financial development is measured as Private 
Credit by Deposit Money Banks over GDP in 1996 (FDc) and is interacted with External dependence (EDj) an industry-level 
measure of reliance on external finance obtained from US firm-level data. Labor market regulation (LMRc) is an indicator of 
employment protection in 1988-1995 and is interacted with labor intensity (LABINTj) computed as the ratio between employees 
and total assets in the USA in 1996. Red tape costs (COSTc) are direct start-up costs of obtaining legal status to operate a firm 
as a share of per capita GDP in 1999; this variable is interacted with growth opportunities (GROPj) measured as the 
compounded average growth rate of production in real terms in industry j in USA over the 1996-2002 period. Public ownership 
(POWNj,c) is an index of exposure of each manufacturing industry j to the degree of public ownership in three selected service 
sectors (energy, communications, transport). It is computed as ∑s s c s j POWN w , ,  where POWNc,s is an index measuring on a 
0-6 scale (increasing with the role of public sector) the degree of public ownership in 1996 and s = ENERGY, TLCPOST and 
TRASP. Weights wj,s are given by technical coefficients computed on the USA 1997 Input-Output matrix (see also data 
appendix). Cols. 5 and 6 report IV estimates obtained using ∑s s c s j X w , , ˆ as instrument for SERVREGj,c. 
s j w , ˆ  is the estimated 
industry j’s dependence on service s net of regulation- and country-specific determinants of factor demand. For each of the four 
services 
s j w , ˆ  are the estimated wj,s in the most deregulated country (c ) and are obtained, for each s, according to the following 
two-step procedure: (a) Regress wj,s,c on country dummies, industry dummies and industry dummies interacted with country-
level regulation in sector s; country c  is excluded from the regression and the estimation follows Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996) to account for the fact that the dependent variable is fractional. (b) Obtain 
s j w , ˆ  as the fitted values of wj,s,c for country c  
net of country c  fixed effect. In col. 5 country c  is the USA while in col. 6 it is set to Great Britain, USA and Finland for 
ENERGY and TRANSP, TLCPOST and PROSERV, respectively. Results in cols 7 and 8 are obtained removing from the sample 
the most and least intensive industrial users of regulated services (“Other non-metallic mineral products” and “Machinery and 
equipment N.E.C.”) and the most and least service-regulated countries (Greece and Sweden), respectively. SHAREj,c is the 
industry share in total value added in manufacturing in 1996. All regressions include (unreported) country- and industry-fixed 
effects and use (employment) weighted least squares as estimation method. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.   29
 
Table 8: Sector-specific effects 













Energy Regulation × Energy dependence  -0.482**      -0.540*  -0.530* 
[Xc,ENERGY  × wj, ENERGY]  (0.147)       (0.232)  (0.232) 
Prof. Serv. Regulation × Prof. Serv. dependence   -0.286*      -0.254*  -0.259* 
[Xc,PROSERV  × wj, PROSERV]   (0.124)      (0.118)  (0.114) 
Communications Regulation × Comm. dep.     -0.417    0.115  0.206 
[Xc,TLCPOST  × wj,TLCPOST]     (1.193)    (1.147)  (1.100) 
Transports Regulation × Transports dependence       -0.231  0.101  0.112 
[Xc,TRANSP × wj, TRANSP]       (0.160)  (0.247)  (0.246) 
Energy Regulation × Global opportunities (energy)           0.038 
[Xc,ENERGY  × GLOPPj, ENERGY]           (0.072) 
Prof. Serv. Regulation × Global opp. (prof. serv.)           -0.343** 
[Xc,PROSERV × GLOPPj, PROSERV]           (0.131) 
Financial dev. × external dep.  0.010* 0.011**  0.010*  0.011* 0.011** 0.011** 
[FDc × EDj]  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Initial industry share  0.171*  0.156* 0.169* 0.167*  0.159*  0.182** 
[SHAREj,c] (0.067)  (0.073)  (0.069)  (0.069) (0.069)  (0.062) 
Constant 0.004  0.014  -0.007 0.004  0.021  0.039 
 (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.020) (0.030)  (0.031) 
Observations 220  220  220  220  220  220 
R-squared 0.69  0.68  0.67 0.67  0.70  0.71 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%              
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at the industry-country level for the period 
1996-2002 (GROWTHj,c). Xc,s * wj,s are interaction terms between country-level measures of regulation in energy, professional 
Services, communications, transports in 1996 (Xc,s) and the corresponding industry-level indicators of dependence (wj,s). 
Interaction weights wj,s are (“direct”) technical coefficients of dependence between service sector s and manufacturing industry 
j computed on the 1997 USA Input-Output matrix. Financial development is measured as Private Credit by Deposit Money 
Banks over GDP in 1996 (FDc) and is interacted with External dependence (EDj) an industry-level measure of reliance on 
external finance obtained from US firm-level data. GLOPPj, ENERGY and GLOPPj, PROSERV are the estimated industry value added 
growth in the USA. For each of the service sector ENERGY and PROSERV, global opportunities (GLOPPj,s) are obtained 
according to the following two-steps procedure: (a) Regress GROWTHj,c on country dummies, industry dummies and industry 
dummies interacted with country-level regulation in sector s; USA are excluded from the regression. (b) Obtain GLOPPj as the 
predicted values of GROWTHj,c for the USA. SHAREj,c indicates the industry share in total value added in manufacturing in 
1996. All regression include (unreported) interaction terms between labor market regulation (LMRc) and labor intensity 
(LABINTj) and between red tape costs (COSTc) and growth opportunities (GROPj) (see table 1 and 7 for the definition of these 
variables). All regressions also include (unreported) country- and industry-fixed effects and use (employment) weighted least 
squares as estimation method. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Service regulation is the simple average of the OECD measures of regulation (Xc,s) in energy, communications and transports. 
Other countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.  
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The figures plot the adjusted-partial residual of sector-specific cross-country regressions of prices and price-cost margins in 
1996 (1997 for TLC). Price data are available from Eurostat’s Economic Reforms database. Energy prices are tons of oil 
equivalent weighted averages of Electricity prices for industrial users (expressed in Euro per kWh) and of gas prices for 
industrial users (Euro per Gigajoule). Telecommunications prices are obtained averaging prices for a 10 minutes local, national 
and international calls (to the USA). All prices are then converted in current US dollars using OECD purchasing power parities. 
Price-cost margins are calculated on OECD STAN database as the ratio of value added net of labor costs over gross output (see 
Aghion et al., 2002). Similar graphs would be obtained using a measure of mark-up, computed as the inverse of the labor 
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